CITIZEN'S DISARMAMENT

Article prepared for IWANAMI By Angie Zelter, May 1999.
(unpublished)
日本語訳

At the moment there are a series of remarkable trials going on in the District Court of Helensburgh - a small rural town in Scotland - and at various Crown Courts in England. The courts are all close to UK nuclear weapon sites. They are the scene of global citizens defending their practical acts of nuclear disarmament under international law and which the Police, Court Officials and Government say is criminal damage. Many of them are using material from the Decision of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal that states that, 'Anyone with knowledge of illegal activity and an opportunity to do something about it is a potential criminal under international law unless the person takes affirmative measures to prevent the commission of crimes'. They are also quoting the Shimoda case as it is the only case ever brought on behalf of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that successfully argued that the bombings breached international law and were in effect war crimes.

Around 50 cases have already been heard and many more are still to come. The defendants range from students in their late teens and early twenties to retired men and women in their seventies and eighties and come from all walks of life. They have blockaded the entrances to the nuclear bases, cut down the fences and got into the bases to disarm the military equipment with simple household tools like hammers and bolt-croppers, glue and paint. They come from all walks of life and share a belief that the time has come for global citizens to create the just and loving world they deserve for themselves. They cannot wait for Government but must start dismantling the evil weapons of mass murder and start transforming the weapons of war into creative life-giving resources.

The courts are having to come to grips with the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice that said in 1996 that nuclear weapons were generally illegal under international law. From an initial stance of 'International law is not applicable in the Scottish courts' we are now getting a more considered response. Everyone has so far been found guilty in the lower courts but a number of appeals are going through and will be taken as far as the European Court of Human Rights if necessary. The one Crown Court case in England (before a Judge and 12 person Jury rather than just one magistrate) has just ended with a hung jury and will have to be re-tried. It seems clear that when taken to a Jury, the people of Britain are more likely to acquit than Judges or Magistrates. It is quite clear to any normal and sane person that if the murder of a single person is outlawed then obviously mass murder is also unlawful. They also seem better able to understand the necessity for practical disarmament if a Government refuses to disarm weapons of mass destruction themselves.

Trident Ploughshares 2000 (TP2000) is a UK based global citizen's initiative to disarm UK nuclear weapons. TP2000 sees itself as being within the context of the ongoing work of the international peace movement that has been actively engaged in nuclear disarmament work ever since the first use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki over 50 years ago. As our part, in the attempt to encourage a nuclear weapons free world to start the new millennium, we are endeavoring to peacefully, openly and accountably disarm the British Trident nuclear weapons system. Our acts of disarmament are intended to stop ongoing criminal activity under well recognised principles of international law.

One hundred and twenty nine international activists, organised into small, independent, support groups of from 3 to 15 people, have already signed a Pledge to Prevent Nuclear Crime and a Nonviolence and Safety Pledge. They come from Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Eire, England, Finland, Holland, Scotland, Sweden, USA and Wales. New people are joining all the time. Although mainly from the UK, around 30% of the activists come from other countries and we act as 'global citizens', as we recognize that British nuclear weapons are a threat to the whole global community and it is thus a global responsibility to disarm them. As TP2000 Pledgers we have publicly committed ourselves to peacefully attempting to disarm part of the British Trident nuclear weapon system. All British nuclear weapons are now deployed on 4 Trident nuclear-powered submarines.

We first approached the Government in March 1998 in an Open Letter requesting urgent discussions regarding the necessity to take immediate steps towards disarming British nuclear weapons and moving towards a non-nuclear defence policy 'in accordance with the international obligations and legal and humanitarian norms which apply to this country'. We pointed out that nuclear weapons are not consistent with the UK Government's stated 'ethical foreign policy' nor is nuclear 'deterrence' a feasible or credible defence policy. We outlined why we felt that 'the ICJ effectively delegitimised nuclear deterrence postures' and why we were most concerned about the UK Government's interpretation of the ICJ's Advisory Opinion and their continuing reliance on nuclear weapons. We found that the post-Cold War 'sub-strategic' mission for Trident was 'mistaken, incoherent and incompatible with international humanitarian law'. We stated that the possession of nuclear weapons is also 'totally incompatible with any common global ethics' and that 'the deployment of Trident misuses resources that should be devoted to the real security challenges facing us in the new millennium: from systemic poverty to widespread environmental degradation, to proliferation and international terrorism, among others'. We outlined a series of nine feasible and verifiable requests that would commit the government to a practical process of nuclear disarmament. (See these at the end of the paper). We stated that if these requests were not being fulfilled then we would begin our open and accountable disarmament ploughshares campaign.

TP2000 was publicly launched on May 2nd 1998 in London, Edinburgh, Gothenburg, Gent and Hiroshima. Further letters were sent to government officials and all 16 NATO Heads of State and Foreign Ministers have been approached. We continue the exchange of letters and are keeping the doors open for any dialogue and negotiation. We are making it clear that we would prefer the 'authorities' to disarm Trident and that we are only making our own attempts because they continue to prevaricate. Before every three-monthly open disarmament action at Faslane we update the P.M. of all the names of the Pledgers in line with our open and accountable policies. Since our first Open Letter we have written six further letters and another Open Letter asking for considered replies to several serious questions and problems that we have raised. We have received no substantive response. Nor have our offers of meetings been taken up.

Since our first Open Letter the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) has been published and has failed to reflect the post Cold War international relations, norms and aspirations as well as counterproductively reinforcing the role of Trident as a 'necessary element of our security'. India and Pakistan have emulated nuclear-armed countries like Britain by conducting nuclear test explosions, in defiance of the anti-testing norm established by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Britain, together with the other declared nuclear weapon states swiftly condemned the tests and called on India and Pakistan not to deploy nuclear weapons, nor test delivery vehicles. However, we have not been told why these weapons that the UK consider necessary for our security are not necessary for the security of India and Pakistan nor have we been given an answer to the question, 'If they have security alternatives to nuclear weapons, why don't we?'

In June 1998, Britain hosted a G-8 meeting to respond to the South Asian nuclear tests. The G-8 communique reinforced the nuclear weapon states' obligations in a paragraph referring not only to Article VI of the NPT, but also to the commitments undertaken in 1995 when the NPT was indefinitely extended, to pursue 'systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally'.

Yet on several occasions Britain has failed to act constructively or positively in international fora when other (non-nuclear) governments have proposed steps that could be undertaken to help make progress. Britain supports a ban on the future production of fissile materials for weapons but has refused to reduce its own existing stocks. Nor has Britain expressed support for any of the many proposals on nuclear disarmament now before the Conference on Disarmament.

In December 1998, Britain voted against most of the UN General Assembly resolutions on nuclear disarmament, including one based on the June 9 Statement of Foreign Ministers of eight non-nuclear countries. Although two EU countries were among the sponsors of the resolution 'Towards a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda', Britain joined the United States and France in trying to bully European Members of NATO into opposing the resolution. This was despite the fact that the resolution called only for further unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions and for the nuclear weapons states and their allies to 'review strategic doctrines'. Although this resolution was entirely consistent with our legal obligations, Britain justified voting against by saying that the resolution advocated measures which had been examined in the SDR and 'which we concluded are, at the present time, inconsistent with the maintenance of a credible minimum deterrent'.

Over 180 countries renounced the possibility of relying on such a 'minimum deterrent' when they joined the NPT, which has been made permanent and given strengthened safeguards. At a time when the UK should be trying to set a positive example of non-proliferation, restraint and disarmament, we have asked how can the UK justify voting against moderate attempts to make progress in the international arena? TP2000 has made it quite clear that we do not accept that in a predominantly non-nuclear world Britain (or anyone else) has the right to nuclear weapons. We reject the concept of minimum deterrence, and even were such a concept coherent, we fail to see how Trident could qualify as such, even with 'only' 48 warheads per boat as the SDR promised.

The major questions asked by TP2000 and which still remain unanswered by the UK Government include the following:-

1) How can the threat to use a Trident nuclear warhead of up to 100 kilotons be consistent with international humanitarian law which specifies the necessity to be able to distinguish between military and civilian targets, which prohibits unnecessary suffering to combatants, prohibits widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment and specifies the inviolability of neutral nations?
a) If Trident is not illegal then will the Government please furnish us with even one detailed example of how, where and when a 100 kiloton Trident nuclear warhead could be used lawfully?
b) One probable target is Yulyamy, a town in northern Russia, close to the border with Norway. It has a population of over 28,000 and it is close to several Russian Navy shipyards which are used to repair nuclear powered submarines. A Trident warhead exploding in the air above the shipyard would create a fireball 870 metres across. The town would be completely flattened. Around 90% of the population would be killed by a combination of radiation, extreme heat and collapsing buildings. The death toll would probably include around 7000 children. The explosion would destroy schools, hospitals and churches. The few survivors would all be seriously injured. Even 4.5 kms from the explosion, anyone in the open would suffer from third degree burns. There would be extensive blast damage and hundreds of casualties in the town of Severomorsk, 10 km away. All this is to say nothing of the extensive secondary radiation which would effect the inhabitants of Norway. On any interpretation of international law it is perplexing to see how this could be legal. Can you assure us that Yulyamy, or any similar places are not on your target lists?
c) When will you institute a public legal review of the targets that the Trident warheads, of unverifiable but variable yields of up to 100 kilotons, would be used against? In our opinion no currently deployed nuclear weapon on Trident could possibly be used against any land-based target without substantially breaching international humanitarian law - they are just too inhumane and terrible with uncontrollable long-term genetic and environmental effects spread over time and space.

2) Given the power and accuracy of conventional forces that could be used in conformity with international law why does the British Government consider nuclear weapons to be 'the ultimate guarantee of the UK's security'?

3) The Strategic Defence Review states that 'The Government is nevertheless unequivocally committed to Britain's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.' However, the ICJ Advisory Opinion interpreted this as an obligation to 'bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects'. How does this square with the UK's defence policy where 'our minimum deterrent remains a necessary element of our security'; 'We need to ensure that it can remain an effective deterrent for up to 30 years'; and describing Trident as 'a capability of such vital importance to our security'?. If the UK Government wanted to indicate a commitment to rid the world of nuclear weapons then it should have made a declaration not to replace Trident instead of saying, 'it would be premature to abandon a minimum capability to design and produce a successor to Trident should this prove necessary'. The NPT was negotiated 30 years ago. How much longer do we have to wait for Britain to carry out its obligations? The World Court stated quite clearly that this obligation 'goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result - nuclear disarmament in all its aspects'.
a) In the Strategic Defence Review, the government stated 'The end of the Cold War has transformed our security environment. The world does not live in the shadow of World War. There is no longer a direct threat to Western Europe or the United Kingdom as we used to know it, and we face no significant threat to any of our Overseas Territories.' As the survival of the UK is not presently under threat, the present threat by the UK to use nuclear weapons, represented by its deployment of Trident, is unlawful. If the Government were to counter this by arguing that a direct threat to British survival might re-emerge at some future date, it would be in effect arguing that it could never agree to eliminate its nuclear weapons - a clear violation of its NPT undertakings.

4) Nuclear weapons are pivotal in national and international affairs because they have such a capacity to undermine our integrity as human beings. They reach into the very heart of humanitarian law. If we allow or legitimise the use of nuclear weapons for any reason whatsoever, if our society, our leaders, can justify the mass destruction of women, children and other civilians then how can we coherently, consistently or rationally disallow any lesser evil? How, therefore, can you assert that Trident is an ethical contribution to British security?

The first open and publicly advertised disarmament actions took place in August 1998 when 100 global citizens were arrested after breaching security at the Faslane and Coulport base many times. Since then three more open disarmament events have taken place at Faslane and our 'secret' but still fully accountable and nonviolent disarmament actions are now beginning and are taking place at variable times and places. On Monday February 1st 1999 two TP2000 Pledgers swam up to HMS Vengeance (docked at Barrow) climbed aboard and painted slogans and then disarmed testing equipment worth over ｣25,000 on the conning tower before entering the submarine. More such actions are planned for the coming months.

To date 201 global citizens from 12 different nations have been arrested and are slowly proceeding through the courts of Scotland and England. They are arguing that their peaceful, safe and accountable practical disarmament of the British Trident-based nuclear weapons system is in accordance with international law and our responsibilities as global citizens to try to prevent nuclear crime. Commander Gillespie on behalf of the UK's Ministry of Defence has stated that 'Trident Ploughshares has stated publicly and on a number of occasions, intentions to commit criminal acts'. However, we totally refute that we are engaged in any criminal acts whatsoever. We are merely trying to uphold international law and prevent the Government from continuing to engage in what we believe are criminal acts on a massive scale.

Customary international law has evolved over centuries to protect neutral countries, innocent bystanders, and the environment from the excesses of war. These laws were the basic legal premises used to condemn those Nazis responsible for the holocaust. These laws are now being applied at the War Crimes Tribunals in The Hague where leaders and officials implicated in the atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia are being prosecuted. The UK Government is right to condemn those who violate these basic norms and standards of humane behaviour, but it still has to accept its own culpability under them and to apply these same norms and standards to its deployment of weapons capable of annihilating millions of people and destroying entire eco-systems. This is pertinent to another Government statement in letters to us where we are told that 'it is totally unacceptable' to directly encourage 'service personnel to refuse to carry out their legal duties'. This again misses the point that these service personnel are being misled as to the law and that it is the UK Government that is giving them unlawful orders, the effect of which is to make them complicit in major and extremely serious breaches of customary international law. It is our duty to inform all service personnel of the Nuremberg Principles and to remind them that they must never obey unlawful orders. We will continue with these warnings and with our disarmament actions.

In the present NATO conflict with Serbia it has been suggested by some commentators that the use of a nuclear weapon could bring the war to a speedy end and that there is no point in having nuclear weapons if we do not use them. The horrendous human suffering as well as environmental degradation and pollution that would take place would obviously violate international law and yet the suggestion shows how the nuclear threat is always present. There will never be safety until all nuclear weapons are completely disarmed. We cannot wait until our Government's do it, we must start the process ourselves in a responsible, nonviolent and safe manner.

The defence we have is a good one and will eventually win in court. One of the reasons that the Scottish Courts are keeping the cases in the lower courts is to prevent a Jury Trial where we might get acquitted. The one Trident Ploughshares case heard in England so far, has resulted in a hung jury and any re-trial has a good chance of reaching a 'not-guilty' verdict. The cases are relying upon the defence of lawful and reasonable excuse of damage to property in order to prevent a terrible crime from being committed. There was a landmark case in 1996 which rocked the English Judiciary when 4 women (I was one) were acquitted of doing one and a half million pounds worth of damage to a Hawk jet-fighter plane due to be exported to Indonesia where it was likely to be used to continue the genocide of the East Timorese people. We were acquitted in June 1986 after having spent 6 months on remand in prison. We admitted disarming the plane and preventing it from being exported to Indonesia but explained that we were acting lawfully and ethically because it would have been used to bomb innocent civilians and this was contrary to international humanitarian law. We won the case. Similarly we will eventually win the legal arguments in our cases against Trident. We will eventually win because the law is based upon ethics and a common morality and there is no way forward for the global community but to impartially enforce all the laws of war and to back all efforts of peaceful and practical nuclear disarmament.

TP2000 is actively searching for more global citizens willing to join international ploughshares groups and to come to the UK to do their acts of disarmament and argue in court the justification of their actions. We have had much moral support from Japan. It would be wonderful if a few Japanese people would now join us so that their powerful testimony can be added to others in the courtrooms.

More information about Trident Ploughshares 2000 can be requested from TP2000, 42-46 Bethel St, Norwich, Norfolk, NR2 1NR, UK, email:- tp2000@gn.apc.org, website address:- http://www.gn.apc.org/tp2000/

The criteria for halting Trident Ploughshares are:

Trident Ploughshares 2000 will halt its activities if the Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, or Secretary of State for Defence, gives us a written undertaking or makes a statement in the House of Commons to the effect that all British nuclear weapons will be disarmed by 1st January 2000 and that the government is committed to implementing a non-nuclear security policy.

We recognise that such an undertaking would be a process consisting both of operational changes, which the government could direct the Ministry of Defence to implement immediately without reference to any other governments or negotiations, and policy changes that will require international negotiations and consultations with foreign suppliers and allies.

Trident Ploughshares 2000 will be prepared to halt our direct activities as long as we are satisfied that genuine progress towards disarming Britain's nuclear capability is being made, but we will resume if undertakings are reversed or unreasonably drawn out or postponed. We regard the following visible and verifiable elements as indispensable to genuine commitment by the government to a process of de-nuclearising Britain.

i) The British Trident submarine system must immediately be taken off 24-hour patrols.
ii) No new Trident missiles are to be purchased from the United States.
iii) All British nuclear warheads must be removed from their delivery systems and stored separately by 1st January 2000.
iv) No further deployment of US nuclear weapons in Britain. Britain should work with its NATO allies and Russia for withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and for establishment of a policy not to use nuclear weapons first or against non-nuclear-armed adversaries in any circumstances.
v) Trident missiles are to be returned to the United States and the warheads to be returned to AWE Aldermaston/Burghfield by an agreed date.
vi) Commitment to a timetable for the decommissioning of British nuclear weapons as fast as is feasible and safe, with a target date for completion of 2010 at the latest.
vii) Pledge not to replace Trident or seek to acquire nuclear weapons again.
viii) Conversion of Britain's nuclear weapon facilities from research and development for the maintenance and production of the nuclear arsenal towards the decommissioning of nuclear weapons and facilities, safe management and disposal of nuclear materials under strict and effective national and international safeguards and controls, and the enhanced verification of international agreements on weapons of mass destruction.
ix) Active and constructive British involvement in the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the goal of negotiating interim agreements leading to a nuclear weapons convention as early as possible. The genuineness and constructiveness of this commitment will be gauged from the positions taken by Britain in United Nations General Assembly resolutions, the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process, the Conference on Disarmament, five-power talks, NATO, and other related fora.